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The parliament sat numbed, in an
otherwise engaging November evening, when President Barack Obama,
head of one of the two largest democracies, reminded the other
that it had largely shied away from condemning suppression of
democratic rights and movements. Obama's specific reference was to
Myanmar and India's imperviousness to the military junta's rigged
elections and repression of democracy groups.
That this reference followed an exuberant praise of India's
support to South Africa's anti-apartheid movement indicated a
veiled rebuke of India's current policy of engaging whoever is in
power in a country of interest.
Neither is Washington an immaculate chevalier of the democracy
sacrament. In fact, half of the world's autocrats owed their
existence to American backing. Yet, at the risk of throwing stone
from a glasshouse, Obama could question India's diminishing
contribution to the global democracy cause, especially when it
aspires to be permanently ordained in the UN Security Council.
Between them, India and the US have issued half-a-dozen joint
statements in the past decade, with platitudinous reaffirmation of
their common democratic virtues and commitment to its promotion
globally. New Delhi, though, has hardly moved a finger in
fulfilling this mission, often relegating such processes as the
internal affairs of a country.
Simply so, its discreet silence and reclusiveness ever since the
Jasmine Revolution swept the Arab world belies its trappings of an
emerging global power. Though ignoring the turbulence in a
less-prominent Tunisia was affordable to the Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA), the Egyptian upheaval has put South Block into a
diplomatic dilemna. At the heart of the matter is New Delhi's
reluctance to write off President Hosni Mubarak, who, like for the
US and Israel, has been a long-time friend of New Delhi since the
Non-Alignment days.
Despite the elephantine street protests, India convincingly feels
Mubarak might pull through, at least temporarily, until a
transition to a new regime. Misplaced fears of a potential
embarrassment from a pro-democracy statement if Mubarak manages to
survive have forced a pathetic timidity in the MEA, which could
not even garner the courage shown by Washington through its fairly
balanced exhortation of an 'orderly transition'.
The roots of the MEA predicament lie not in its 'realist' policy
transmutation of engaging useful regimes irrespective of their
political attire. India's insensitivity towards the 'revolution'
could rather be attributed to the absence of a policy on how to
approach political emancipation movements in the neighbourhood and
farther out. After decades of Nehruvian-inspired crusades in
favour of freedom struggles, third world empowerment and nuclear
have-nots, India's enhanced power profile, spurred by its
astonishing economic growth, had prompted it to place itself among
the global elite, but without appreciation of the responsibilities
that comes with such elevation.
Driven by enlightened national interest, India has competitively
engaged autocrats and juntas in its increasing bid to outmanoeuvre
the Chinese influence in its strategic hinterland, extending up to
Africa. Lost in this policy transformation was its ideological
conviction on democracy and the will to endorse popular movements.
The turmoil in Egypt is an acid test which though also endows an
opportunity to frame a long-term policy on its approach to popular
movements and political turmoil. For, soon to follow on the heels
of Egypt could be similar exigencies in volatile nations,
including Yemen, Syria and Iran, and possibly even in the
neighbourhood, in Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.
A principled stand on such issues also becomes a pre-qualification
for the UNSC ambition, more so being a billion-strong democracy.
An Indian contribution to the democracy discourse is significant
considering the dichotomies and prejudices that has emerged during
the Bush years. Even while issuing joint statements with the Bush
administration on promotion of democracy, New Delhi had not
endorsed the Bush doctrine of forced regime change in tumultuous
zones like the Middle East and Africa.
The Egyptian case embodies the diplomatic quandary for external
powers forced to respond to political movements in regions known
for their ethnic fault-lines, and where democracy has little
rooting. The underlying theme of the Egyptian movement is to gain
an inalienable right for the people to decide their destiny.
Egyptians are revolting against a decades-old system wherein power
elites subverted the means of popular determination and
unilaterally determined the nation's course.
The permeation of the Jasmine Revolution across the Arab world,
and potentially to Africa and Middle East, could largely be
attributed to the fact many of the nations in these regions are
governed by autocracies, Mukhabarat (military-intelligence)
regimes, and in some cases theocracies, all of which gives only
marginal space for people's will.
A post-Mubarak transition need not necessarily end up in a pure
democratic system, rather could even lead to another
semi-autocracy or a junta. Like in Pakistan, the army holds the
reins of Egypt's political system. Notwithstanding its sympathies
for the movement, its plans for the transition are ambiguous. For,
in a highly-fractured polity with no credible alternatives, the
army will be self-empowered to preside over the transition. Fears
of the radical Muslim Brotherhood attaining sway have gained
traction, which could encourage a long-term military involvement
to ensure moderation.
Considering this scenario, an outright support to the movement
might not be prudent. Rather, the Indian approach should be to
back a reform process that could facilitate a free-and-fair
franchise to determine the future of the nation. Ultimately,
Egyptians will have to decide their destiny, even if it is for an
Islamic republic or an Islamocracy.
(The author is associate fellow, Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. He can be contacted at vinujnu@gmail.com).
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