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Muslim
Intellectuals reject Taliban Ban on Female Education:
Taking strong
exceptions of the reports that are appearing in the media about the
Taliban Ban on Female Educations, the Muslim
theologists...Read
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At its recently-held 30th convention
held at Deoband, the Jamiat ul-Ulema-e Hind passed a significant
resolution on girls’ education which, surprisingly, received little
attention in the media. The original Urdu version of the resolution
calls upon Muslims to establish ‘non-residential institutions for
providing religious and modern education to girls, for which an
appropriate syllabus should be prepared.’ ‘Their education’, it goes
on, ‘must be fully in accordance with the limits set by the shariah
and the rules of pardah. Co-education must be fully avoided, or else
it is feared that more harm than good would result.’ The English
version of the resolution reads somewhat differently. It appeals to
Muslims to ‘establish non-residential modern educational
institutions for girls’ education’ that would be based on a ‘special
syllabus for them, which should be completed within six years.’ ‘On
completion of 10 years of age,’ it adds, ‘complete shariah norms
should be observed while continuing their education.’
The Jamiat’s encouraging, though
belated, appeal for modern education for Muslim girls is indeed
laudable. However, on critical examination, it might not actually
amount to much, and there may be more to it than what actually meets
the eye. The actual import of the Jamiat’s endorsement of modern
education for Muslim girls appeal hinges crucially on two issues.
Firstly, the contents of the ‘special’
syllabus that it recommends for girls, which, it lays down, they
should complete within six years, by which they would reach the age
of ten (regarded by many as the age of puberty or balaghat).
And, secondly, the practical
implications, in terms of rules, regulations and restrictions, of
the Jamiat’s own understanding of ‘complete shariah norms’ (or, as
the Urdu version of the translation puts it, the ‘limits set by the
shariah and the rules of pardah’) that it insists Muslim girls must
observe if they wish to continue their education after the age of
ten.
It is significant to note in this
regard that the resolution—probably deliberately—remains silent on
what exactly the Jamiat understands as ‘complete shariah norms’ or
‘the limits set by the shariah and the rules of pardah’. These terms
are, in fact, vague and deeply contested among Muslims themselves.
Some Muslims regard the shariah as sanctioning a whole range of
rights for women, and, indeed, as being fundamentally opposed to
women’s subordination and patriarchy. In contrast, other Muslims
understand the shariah in a contrary, indeed sternly patriarchal,
manner. Being a body of leading Deobandi ulema, it is but to be
expected that the Jamiat’s understanding of what it calls ‘shariah
norms and limits’ and ‘the rules of pardah’ corresponds to the
general Deobandi interpretation of these concepts.
In practical terms, this might well
mean restricting women to domestic roles and spaces (allowing them
to step out of their homes only in cases of extreme necessity,
provided they cover up entirely); considering not just women’s
bodies but even their voices to be ‘awrah’ or to be concealed from
‘strange’ (ghayr) men; prohibiting any sort of interaction between
women and ‘strange’ men, even in workplaces and educational
institutions; and so on. These rules and restrictions reflect the
particular Deobandi understanding of the shariah—one, it is crucial
to recognize, that is fiercely contested by other Muslims, who
interpret the concept and content of the shariah in a strikingly
different manner.
It is thus to be expected that when
the Jamiat calls for shariah norms to be fully observed while
providing education for girls above the age of ten it would want
these rules, upheld by the Deobandis as normative and binding, to be
strictly imposed on them. Needless to say, this would greatly
constrain and limit what, and how, Muslim girls can actually learn.
Precisely what the Jamiat would want Muslim girls to learn would be
reflected in the ‘special’ syllabus for them that it calls for. Yet,
the resolution does not go into the details of what this ‘special’
syllabus should be.
A good illustration of the Deobandi
position on girls’ education is provided in a recently-published
book by a Deobandi scholar from Bihar, Maulvi Abdul Basit Hamidi
Qasmi, a graduate of the Dar ul-Ulum at Deoband. The book, a
collection of the author’s speeches delivered at various religious
gatherings, boasts the pompous title of Nayab Taqreeren: Asr-e Hazir
Ke Taqazon Se Hamahang Sulagte Masail Par Mubni Chand Inami Taqriron
Ka Majmua , which translates roughly as ‘Rare Speeches: A Collection
of Some Prized Lectures on Burning Contemporary Issues’. The book
contains short forewords and notes of appreciation by numerous
leading Deobandi ulema, including teachers of the Deoband madrasa
and the Jamia Rahmani, Munger, one of the premier Deobandi madrasas
in Bihar. Presumably, therefore, the contents of the book reflect a
widely-shared shade of opinion among numerous Deobandi ulema.
One speech included in the book,
titled Talim ul-Niswan Ka Nizam (‘The System of Girls’ Education’),
deals specifically with the issue of what Qasmi believes to be the ‘Islamically’-appropriate
form of education for Muslim girls. The author argues that Islam
stresses the acquisition of ‘knowledge’ (ilm) for all Muslims, males
as well as females. However, in contrast to many other Muslim
scholars, who take this to mean sanction for both religious and
secular knowledge, Qasmi claims that here ‘knowledge’ refers only to
‘religious knowledge’ (ilm-i din), or, as he puts it, ‘that
knowledge through which one’s religious beliefs and prayer are
perfected’. He argues, contending with critics who assert the
contrary, that when the Prophet insisted that all Muslims should
acquire knowledge as a religious duty, what he meant was
specifically ‘religious knowledge’. He critiques other Muslims who
include ‘worldly’ subjects under the rubric of Islamically-appropriate
knowledge, arguing that subjects like ‘English, History and
Geography are not ilm, but, rather, skills (hunar)’.
Restricting compulsory knowledge
simply to ‘religious knowledge’ as narrowly defined, Qasmi opposes
the teaching of ‘non-religious’ education for Muslim girls. He
regards those who advocate this sort of education for girls as
‘blindly imitating Europeans’. He sees ‘non-religious’ knowledge as
good only for enabling people to work outside the home, and argues
that this is un-necessary for Muslim girls because Islam, as he
understands it, is against this practice. Earning a livelihood, he
insists, is the duty of men, not women, and it is binding on women
to observe pardah or seclusion. ‘Worldly knowledge cannot be had
while observing pardah’, he claims, thus ruling out such education
for Muslim girls.
However, he adds, under conditions of
‘severe necessity’ there is no absolute prohibition on a woman
learning modern subjects, but this must be done in pardah and only
after completing her religious studies. For this purpose, he lays
down, she must study only from another woman, or, if this is not
possible, then from a mahram male, that is a male relative whom she
is forbidden by Islamic law from marrying. In case a woman has no
male relative to support her financially, he grudgingly says, it is
permissible for her to learn some ‘worldly crafts’ so that she can
earn her livelihood, but still, he warns ‘she should be an expert in
religious, not worldly, knowledge’.
Qasmi insists that ‘worldly knowledge
is not good for women, and, in fact, can be destructive for them’,
adding that ‘all the problems of women can only be solved through
‘Islamic education’, by which, presumably, he means such education
as is narrowly interpreted by most Deobandi ulema. He appears to
equate modern education with Westernisation, and condemns the latter
outright. ‘Western culture is blind’, he says, and so, he asks, ‘how
can it provide light to others?’ To bolster this claim he quotes
some obscure Western writers, who, he claims, are ‘great
intellectuals’, who argue that the right place of women is the home
and that women must not be allowed to gain higher education.
Interestingly, he does not provide any references for these quotes.
Thus, for instance, he refers to a
certain ‘Samuel Samails’, whom he describes as ‘the greatest writer
in England, and possessor of lofty morals’, who says that ‘a
respectable woman is one who stays at home and spins thread’,
lamenting that women today refuse to do so. ‘Samails’ is also
approvingly quoted as saying that women should learn ‘only that
modicum of chemistry that will help them remove the froth from food
cooking in vessels, and that amount of geography that will enable
them to learn the usefulness of windows and ventilators’. As if
this were not enough, Qasmi quotes another Western scholar, a
certain ‘Lord Brain’, whom he describes as a ‘Jew’, who reportedly
insists that woman’s library should possess no book other than the
Torah and the Bible, and who bemoans the fact that today ‘besides
their biological differences, all other differences between males
and females have been erased’. To further reinforce his argument,
Qasmi refers to yet another Western writer, described as an
‘American scholar’, a certain ‘Losan’, who argues that ‘women have
no capacity for higher education’, because such education is
‘against their nature’.
Qasmi’s opposition to ‘modern’
education for girls stems essentially from the argument that such
education must necessarily be defined as ‘Western’, and, therefore,
as immoral and irreligious. Seeing traditional Deobandi-style
education as normative, he cannot conceive the possibility of a
harmonious combination of Islamic and ‘modern’ ‘worldly’ knowledge.
‘Modern’ education, as Qasmi sees it, is bound to lead Muslim women
away from the path of Islam. All ‘modern’ educated Muslim women are
painted with the same brush.
Thus, Qasmi claims, making no room for
any exceptions, that all such women ‘care nothing about religion; do
not distinguish between the permissible and the forbidden; know
nothing about the angels; and do not know which angels used to
deliver the Divine revelations or how many famous angels there are
and what their names are, or the details of the life after death, or
the number of heavenly books, and which prophet received which book
and who the first prophet was, or the reality of faith and
disbelief’. ‘Modern’ educated women, he goes on, ‘have no love for
Islam’. ‘They use magic and spells to subjugate their husbands; very
few of them know the Prophet’s mothers’ name; they are not observant
of prayers; and are ignorant of the rules of religious purity’.
‘Women today’, he claims, ‘are interested only in fighting, abusing,
lying, backbiting, going to the cinema, watching television, and
cooking’. ‘They move around without caring for pardah, and engage in
adultery’. He describes Muslim women who study in colleges and
universities as doing so simply in order to ‘become European and
English’, and accuses their male relatives who arrange for them to
take admission in such institutions as ‘sellers of their
conscience’. In short, he says, these women have begun to ‘follow
Satan’. ‘All this’, he argues, ‘is because they lack religious
education’. Due to this, he claims, ‘their actions are not good’.
To remedy this situation, Qasmi says,
Muslim girls must be educated only in religious madrasas. This is
also crucial, he contends, because if women lack religious education
their children and the future generations of Muslims might be
tempted to stray in the direction of disbelief and immorality.
Ideally, he lays down, Muslim girls should study in their own homes,
from older female relatives or, if this is not possible, then from
mahram males who have some knowledge of Islam. Brighter girls can be
given higher religious education, and for the others it is enough to
teach them ‘basic religious rules’ and encourage them to observe
these.
This, Qasmi argues, approvingly
quoting the Deobandi scholar Ashraf Ali Thanvi, is the ‘best method’
of girls’ education. If this is not possible, then girls can be
allowed to study in all-girls’ religious madrasas in their own
locality. They should not be sent to co-educational madrasas under
any cost ‘because these are bereft of shame and modesty’. In the
madrasas girls should observe strict pardah. They should not study
with non-mahram male teachers and must not have any contact with
male employees. In addition to religious subjects, Qasmi says, they
should also be taught various domestic skills. Significantly, he
makes no reference at all to the teaching of non-religious
disciplines, thus suggesting that he is opposed to girls learning
anything other religious subjects.
Mercifully, Qasmi does not speak for
all Muslims or even for all ulema, although his views find a
powerful echo among many traditionalist Deobandis. As numerous
studies have shown, many Muslim families in India today are
increasingly seeking to educate their daughters, providing them with
both religious as well as secular education. It remains to be seen
if, in the face of this, the conservative Deobandi ulema, including
those associated with the Jamiat, are willing to relent or, as seems
equally likely, will continue in their obdurate opposition to
anything but a very traditional education for Muslim girls, thereby
further reinforcing Muslim marginalisation.
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