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An op-ed in the venerable Times of
India, “No More Chasing Shadows” (9 September, 2011), has the head
of a so-called “group on C4ISRT (Command, Control, Communications
and Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and
Targeting) in South Asia” casting the net of prospective
terrorists wider, but not wide enough to possibly net the more
likely suspects.
The writer considers the public stereotype of the terrorist as a
“desperately poor, illiterate, uneducated, rural-based or
ghetto-based, religious fanatic, a single young man in his late
teens or early twenties” as inadequate. “Madrassa students from
poor families” are no longer the usual suspects. Instead, he
alights on those who “have no criminal records; are usually highly
educated professionals such as engineers, doctors and architects;
are usually married men with children; and have never displayed
any religious extremism.”
As I read all this I got a feeling he’s describing me. He goes on
to say, chillingly for me as I read on, that terrorists come from
“upper middle class families and exhibit only moderate religious
behaviour.” According to him, I am now half way down to becoming a
“terror activist”. Casting the net to include both the “poor,
illiterate” and the “rich, educated” leaves out the hypothetical
“poor, educated” and “rich, uneducated”, perhaps to be placed in
the dragnet over the next two blasts. Muslim women, Ishrat Jahan
notwithstanding, have got away unscathed.
He goes on to enlighten us, “Most of them joined the SIMI or HuJI
only a few weeks earlier, and their families, colleagues, and
close friends had detected no indications of their having done
so.” To him, “Even their families and friends would have no
inkling of their having been recruited…”. This means that you
don’t really know if I have joined up or not as yet. You will only
know when I commit my first terror act which to him will be the
“first illegal or immoral act which they have ever committed.”
Apparently, elsewhere it has taken years but only “three weeks”
for the likes of me to “carry out a terror attack to avenge the
perceived discrimination.”
Luckily, my employers have not “discriminated” against me
professionally nor have I been “denied entry in social circles
commensurate” with my education. Thankfully, I have no reason to
be a terrorist, on this score at least. That is a relief. But, not
for long though.
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, the author, has more. Commending the
Indian state for the “brilliant manner in which the Indian
government used the Jat Sikhs in the police and armed forces to
work on the Jat Sikhs in the Khalistani secessionist organisations”,
he recommends setting up educated Muslims against Muslim
terrorists. What the Sachar and Ranganath Mishra Committees could
not do and what Harsh Mander’s Centre for Equity Studies report
has not managed to dent, this honcho from the intelligence
community urges of the state: “It is high time that intelligence
agencies and police recruited large numbers of Muslims of various
sects in the middle to senior positions, and built bridges…” That
should get the educated unemployed a job, catching terrorists. And
I having passed the average age of such would-be terrorists, could
perhaps land one such job. The logic apparent is “set a thief, to
catch a thief”, or more intellectually, the phrase Delhi has
historically been conversant with, “divide et impera”.
As an educated middle class Muslim, I have often had to hear,
“Stand up and speak out!” I was required to speak out against the
usurpation of my religion by fanatics and condemn terrorism. I now
choose to follow the advice. I begin by emulating SR “Epiglottis”
Khan, “I am not a terrorist!” I venture further than my brief,
“Nor are my coreligionists!” Let me explain why.
By his cryptic designation, Mr. Rao, appears to be a denizen of
the shadowy, intelligence world. His world view is perhaps
representative of the intelligence community. On that score it
needs dissection. He quotes profusely from the “Band of Boys”
theory of Marc Sageman, “a forensic psychiatrist who has worked
for the CIA in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” He also approvingly
points to the UK police’s surveillance of congregations in
mosques. Clearly, great gains have been made by Mr. Chidambaram’s
trips overseas in terms of emulating homeland security measures
elsewhere, as indeed they must. But how far are the conditions
there replicated in India and corresponding counter measures
import worthy?
The intelligence agencies can be likened to someone who has lost
his car keys in the dark and proceeds to look for them under the
light of the lamp post only. While no effort needs to be spared in
getting terrorists to book, this is applicable for terrorists of
any hue. The problem is in assuming the blasts that have taken
place as having the minority’s signature. This is true only to an
extent. A proportion of blasts can now be irrefutably attributed
to majoritarian extremists of the Abhinav Bharat variety. It may
be worth investigation if the Abhinav Bharat is merely the tip of
the iceberg, with its underwater mass perhaps stretching into the
state and its intelligence agencies.
There are several blasts yet unexplained. These include the
horrendous ones in metropolitan cities of 2008. The holes in the
Batla House encounter story do not lend confidence to close these
cases as attributable to Aqil and his Azamgarh cohort, now largely
eliminated. The pre-CWG shooting of Taiwanese “tourists” (actually
TV journalists), the High Court blast of earlier this year and now
the latest, the nineteenth, blast in Delhi, cannot necessarily be
ascribed as minority perpetrated violence. In other words, the net
needs to be cast wider. Why?
The 2008 blasts were in the run up to national elections. The
narrative sought could have been that the UPA was “soft” on terror
because of vote bank concerns. Likewise, this time round, the
Supreme Court mandated investigations in the Gujarat carnage case
are set to culminate soon. There is disarray in the right wing
mainstream. The Anna agitation provided a momentary respite. It is
perhaps reckoned that it is time to get back to the main story.
In other words, a crime has been committed, a motive exists.
Evidence must then be sought. When the soul of India is at stake,
in so far as the perpetrators are concerned in upsetting the
status quo, lives are expendable. There is a case for setting the
NIA to look for the keys where they are as likely to be found as
anywhere else. The government in not owning up to a strategy makes
of Digvijay Singh, a maverick.
The question of motives needs to detain us just a little longer,
in order to flesh out a case for NIA intervention. First, what
could be the possible gains for minority-based terrorists, in case
they are assumed to be behind all this; and, second, what are the
gains for majoritarian terrorists?
Taking Muslim terrorist formations as a reality and as strategic
actors, it can be said that in so far as they were motivated by a
desire for reprisal for perceived structural violence and actual
direct violence against Muslims, their case has long ceased to
have credibility. The earlier blasts, in which Muslims have had a
role, albeit one externally abetted, have sufficed to sublimate
this hate and desire for revenge. Retribution cannot be open
ended. Therefore, taking the campaign into yet another decade
makes little sense.
Second, the government is one that is
responsive to minority demands. Cornering it and giving the
opposition an opportunity to do so makes no sense. Third, the
contrived connection that some, including denizens of intelligence
agencies and media stalwarts seek to establish between
“homegrown”, “external agents” and “international terror” is just
that, contrived. The idea that a green flag can unfurl atop Red
Fort is as farcical as a saffron one atop it in as diverse a
country as India. Giving Muslim terrorists such wide ambitions is
to help justify ghettoisation of the minority for right wing
political purposes. This brief strategic analysis indicates that
Muslim terrorists, nor the community, can hope to gain by taking
to violence and to such extents as is being portrayed.
Next, what are the gains for the majoritarian terrorists and the
political formations that they serve? They gain, as just
mentioned, by cornering the minority. This helps create the
“Other” (Muslim) for the “Us” (Hindu). It helps with the cohesion
of the majority. The cohesion sought can then be translated into
votes and political power. Taking over the state can then help
change its configuration, legitimately, transparently and more
effectively. This aim can do with some Chanakyan ruses, such as
black propaganda by deed in which bomb blasts are portrayed as
minority perpetrated.
Consequently, the TOI op-ed writer is right in demanding “original
innovative thinking on part of India’s intelligence agencies”, but
wrong in pointing them towards an “appreciation of the psychology
of urban Indian Muslim professionals.” That he does so stinks of
an attempt to put the intelligence agencies off the smell. The
purpose, now easier to discern, is to intimidate into silence
engaged Muslim voices pointing out that the emperor is without
clothes.
With this piece of propaganda occupying prime place in a leading
national daily, it can be irrefutably said that the fringe has
gone mainstream. At such junctures, Niemöller’s phrase comes
readily to mind, “Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak
out because I wasn’t a Jew. Then they came for me and there was no
one left to speak out for me.” Unless, of course, secular Hindus
stand up and speak!
This article appeared
in New Delhi based fortnightly The Milli Gazette
print issue of 16-30 September 2011
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