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The reason why nations place a
significant part of their nuclear arsenals on board
nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is because
of their invulnerability, in comparison with static airforce bases
and missile sites or even mobile launchers. Once at its patrol
station, a few hundred meters underwater, the SSBN is considered
safe from prying sensors, including satellites.
From this top-secret redoubt, her battery of ballistic missiles,
poses the threat of a devastating riposte, to any adversary who
may contemplate a nuclear first-strike.
In this context, yesterday's final launch of the K-15
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), marking successful
completion of its developmental programme, is yet another feather
in the DRDO's cap. This event denotes the achievement of mastery
over a sequence of esoteric technologies by our scientists. These
include; safe underwater ejection of the missile, ignition of its
rocket-motor at the moment of breaking surface, control during its
ballistic-trajectory and precise delivery of its payload over the
target.
All that remains to be tested is how the K-15's nuclear warhead
will fare during its hypersonic flight and white-hot re-entry into
the atmosphere; and the kind of explosive yield that its nuclear
blast will deliver. However, the last bit may remain an unknown,
in view of India's self-imposed 1998 test-moratorium and the
comprehensive test-ban treaty.
The primary aim of India's no-first use (NFU) nuclear arsenal has
always been to deter China from threatening it or attempting
coercion with its powerful nuclear arsenal. It is for this reason
that Indian scientists have steadfastly persevered, since the
early 1980s, in their endeavours to produce a missile capable of
delivering a sizeable nuclear warhead(s) out to an
inter-continental range of 5000-8000 km. Their worthy efforts were
crowned by success, with the successful test-firing of the Agni-V
last year; and India can now claim to have an effective,
land-based, nuclear deterrent against China.
An SSBN, being a vessel of immense strategic value, has to be
deployed, with care and secrecy, in areas which are not frequented
by shipping traffic. Their patrol stations are, therefore, chosen
in remote parts of the ocean where they can loiter for months at a
time, without fear of detection or interference. The obvious
corollary is; that their missile range must be adequate to reach
adversary targets from safe waters. For example the Chinese Jin
class SSBN is armed with the JL-2 SLBM which has a range of 8000
km and can, thus, target both San Francisco and Kolkata from the
South China Sea.
In this context, it becomes obvious that the 750 km range of the
K-15 is grossly insufficient for it to zero in on targets in
mainland China from home waters. To be a truly effective third leg
of the nuclear triad, an Indian nuclear submarine, will have to
await the delivery of an underwater launched missile of
intercontinental range, so that it can threaten desired targets
from safe patrols areas in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.
However, it must be recognized that the US, Soviet and the Chinese
navies had all followed a similar route before achieving SLBM
capability of intercontinental range. Installed on board the, soon
to be commissioned, SSBN Arihant, there is no doubt that the K-15
will serve as a most valuable stepping-stone and learning tool for
more capable SLBMs that will follow.
Nuclear deterrence is all about sending the right signals to the
adversary, and there is a school of thought that Pakistan has
already misinterpreted, inadvertently or deliberately, a number of
Indian signals. The K-15 must not add to this list.
Even as India sought deterrence stability with respect to China,
it clearly understood that the latter's strategic calculus and
nuclear arsenal looked well beyond India to include the US and
Russia. It is a most regrettable aspect of sub-continental
geo-politics that Pakistan has been unwilling to acknowledge that
India's arsenal, too, was predicated on factors other than
Pakistan, and has consistently sought to acquire parity with
India.
Regardless of India's true intentions in undertaking the Pokhran I
nuclear test in May 1998, Islamabad jumped to the conclusion that
India had embarked on a Pak-centric nuclear weapon programme and
accelerated its own ongoing Islamic-bomb project. The test of the
liquid-fuelled, nuclear-capable 150 km range Prithvi missile in
1988 and that of the 1500 km range Agni, in the following year,
confirmed Pakistani apprehensions that India's nuclear capability
was intended, not against China, but itself; the ranges of these
missiles seemed to confirm this. India's, much publicized,
ballistic-missile defence programme, the launch of the Arihant and
the maiden display of Agni V during the R-Day parade may have all
added to this paranoia. None of these developments are meant to be
Pakistan-centric, but the induction of the 750 km K-15 SLBM will
certainly fuel the fears of Pakistani Cassandras.
In a related context, since nuclear weapons have a large kill
radius, accuracy is a relatively minor consideration for the
delivery system - as long as the targeting strategy calls for
counter-value attacks against cities, envisaged in the current
Indian nuclear doctrine. However, the mention of single-digit
accuracy' by the DRDO chief in the K-15 context raises the spectre
of 'counter-force' targeting; and an entirely different ball-game.
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, fuelled by its praetorian army, have
acquired such a desperate edge that its fissile plutonium
production rate, from Chinese supplied reactors, will soon enable
it to acquire one of the world's largest warhead inventories.
Apart from inducting cruise missiles, Pakistan has also stepped
into the dangerous realm of tactical nuclear weaponry, and, there
has been intriguing mention of Pakistan Navy's Strategic Forces
Command being the 'custodian of the nation's 2nd strike
capability'.
India's scientists having done their job well; it is high time
that India's national security experts and analysts stepped on to
the strategic stage and, apart from considering the strategic
context of the K-15, reflect on the state of mutual suspicion,
rather than the actual needs of deterrence and stability that seem
to be driving the growth of nuclear arsenals on the sub-continent.
Admiral (retd.) Arun
Prakash is a former chief of the Indian Navy and former chairman,
Chiefs of Staff Committee. The views expressed are personal. He
can be contacted at arunp2810@yahoo.com
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